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 1 
 
Terrorism, lawmaking and democratic politics:  
legislators as security actors 
 
Abstract: Counterterrorist law is all too often made in a rushed, reactive and 
repetitious way, marginalizing the deliberative, critical and democratic 
functions of legislatures and leading to outcomes that later prove to be 
unconstitutional and counter-productive for public security. Using a political 
sociology approach, the article offers an analysis and theorisation of the 
practice of counterterrorist lawmaking. Through the UK example, the article 
argues that counterterrorist lawmaking compounds the existing unequal power 
relationships of the parliamentary field, and presents legislators with an 
inscrutable dilemma about the true stakes involved in legislative security 
politics. 
 
Making new counterterrorist laws has become an internationally widespread response 
to terrorism. After 9/11, states the world over strengthened or enacted new 
counterterrorism legislation. The USA PATRIOT Act, expedited through congress 
with minimal scrutiny or opposition, attracted international concern for its civil 
liberties and human rights implications.i The UK government pushed draconian 
‘emergency’ counterterrorist legislation through parliament within weeks of the 
event.ii Anglophone common law countries followed suit, drawing heavily on British 
legislation and jurisprudence.iii In continental Europe, Germany, Norway, Belgium, 
Greece and Sweden all passed new laws.iv This list is far from comprehensive. Some 
states enacted specific counterterrorism legislation for the first time. Others such as 
the UK, France and Turkey already had a long history in this area, reflecting historic 
internal political struggles. The UN Security Council helped foster this international 
legislative trend by unanimously adopting Resolution 1373 on 28 September 2001. 
This called on member states to create a range of counterterrorism measures, through 
legislation if necessary. At the same time it created a Counter-Terrorism Committee 
(CTC) with an executive directorate to monitor states’ implementation of the 
resolution and the subsequent Resolution 1624 (2005). 
 
Despite this trend, research on counterterrorism pays little attention to the role of 
legislature. Most focuses on government policy,v the nature of security threatsvi or the 
letter and function of the law.vii Indeed, there is no existing theory of security that 
takes the legislature seriously. The main debates about the control of terrorism and 
political violence in the last decade have followed a well-rehearsed argument in 
modern political thought from John Locke to Carl Schmitt that in times of emergency, 
executive prerogative prevails, suspending the law and marginalizing the 
legislature.viii This existing framing cannot do analytical justice to the important role 
of legislators and legislative/executive power relations in counterterrorism. This 
article addresses this neglect. 
 
Despite the impression given by some security analysts, the making of law is not 
simply a matter of executive decision.ix Legislating is a practice embedded in the 
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 2 
power relationships of a field of socially and politically situated actors. Government 
ministers, members of legislatures, civil servants and other public officials must 
negotiate public demands for action, political manoeuvres, unequal access to 
information, parliamentary and constitutional conventions, bureaucratic procedures 
and liberal democratic principles. This article focuses on the role of the legislature in 
the counterterrorist lawmaking process. However, understanding the entire empirical 
process of making law would require a focus on government policy making and the 
workings of the civil service, which is beyond the scope of this paper.x  
 
This article uses a political sociology framework derived from the work of Pierre 
Bourdieu in order to highlight the power relationships and embedded practices of 
counterterrorist lawmaking. The analysis focuses on the UK example, which because 
of its long history of counterterrorism offers a rich range of empirical sources such as 
several decades of debates, reviews, inquiries and committees on terrorism law. 
Analytically, this historical depth is important because it avoids the assumption that 
these issues are specific to a unique post-9/11 environment. Because states have such 
different histories, legal systems and constitutional arrangements, it is difficult to 
generalize from one state to all. As this paper will argue, the nature and character of 
counterterrorist lawmaking derives heavily from nationally specific historical, 
constitutional and institutional power structures. To move from a specific analysis to a 
generalized theory would run counter to this argument. Moving beyond the UK 
example would hence require extensive comparative work rather than generalization, 
which space does not permit. Nevertheless, it is hoped that the UK example and the 
theoretical framework offered can still shed light on the general issue of 
counterterrorist lawmaking and the role of legislatures as security actors.  
 
Existing research and commentary in the UK shows that counterterrorist lawmaking is 
a highly problematic practice, all too often rushed, reactive and repetitious.xi Laws are 
expedited at the behest of the executive, with legislative process radically shortened 
from a few months to a few days. Such laws proceed with overwhelming cross-party 
support. Every legal commentary on counterterrorist law makes the same observation: 
knee-jerk legislation is the inevitable legislative response to major terrorist attacks.xii 
Parliamentarians themselves have recognized that instead of providing careful 
scrutiny of legislative proposals, discussing the nature of the threat and assessing the 
necessity and proportionality of the response, they are invariably swayed by the shock 
of events, acceding to executive demands and symbolic pressures for consensus and 
expedited legislative process.xiii Yet legislative actors seem to forget all this the next 
time there is a perceived security emergency, when they repeat the same problematic 
practices. This undermines the scrutiny and oversight that are vital for effective and 
legitimate decision making in liberal democracies.xiv  
 
In addition to the process of counterterrorist lawmaking, its legal, social and security 
outcomes are also problematic. Counterterrorist laws frequently contain draconian and 
illiberal measures that are found by the courts to be unconstitutional or contrary to 
human rights laws, but only after several years of use. By this time they have often 
damaged community relations, liberal democratic legitimacy and, arguably, public 
This is the Author’s Final Version of © Neal, A. (2012). Terrorism, Lawmaking and Democratic Politics: 
Legislators as Security Actors. Terrorism and Political Violence, 24(3), 357-374 doi: 
10.1080/09546553.2011.628721 
 
Please refer to the published article for citation purposes. 
 
 
 3 
security itself.xv The problems of counterterrorist lawmaking are well known, but 
there is little in-depth analysis of how the practice works and why. 
 
However, it is not as simple as arguing that counterterrorist lawmaking is an abuse of 
democratic process. In the UK system the constitutionally ‘correct’ way of making 
counterterrorist law is not clear. The UK’s historically evolving ‘unwritten’ 
constitution means that nowhere is this codified. Rather, there are competing 
constitutional principles at work: on the one hand the historical principle of legislative 
(and judicial) deference to the executive on matters of security, but on the other hand 
the principle of parliamentary democracy, usually conceived in the UK as holding the 
executive to account through scrutiny and oversight (the concept of ‘checks and 
balances’ is not an explicit feature of the British constitutional landscape). Since the 
1998 Human Rights Act, the defence of human rights has also become a 
constitutional principle and statutory duty, which is very much in tension with 
executive security prerogative. What is needed, therefore, is an understanding of these 
tensions and how they play out politically.  
 
The UK example  
 
In the UK, the problematic practice of counterterrorist lawmaking is historically 
institutionalized. It has been reproduced over generations of legislators and across 
profound changes in the security environment. The problem of rushed, reactive and 
repetitious security legislation goes back almost a century. New instalments of 
legislation are invariably enacted in response to terrorist events or similar.
xviii
xvi These 
laws are understood as temporary emergency measures, yet inevitably they become a 
permanent feature of the statute books.xvii In occasional moments of self-reflection 
when some time has passed since the last major security event, parliamentarians 
recognize that security issues introduce unusual dynamics into the legislative process: 
parliament fails to learn lessons from the past and is swayed by the shock of terrorist 
events.  In response to this and the changing security environment, British 
governments periodically instigate reviews of law and policy, which almost always 
result in making permanent, or ‘normalizing’, the patchwork of laws that were once 
considered as temporary and exceptional. I have analyzed the process of 
normalization in more detail elsewhere,xix but suffice it to say here that the reason 
why such laws become normalized is because, despite a discourse of emergency, 
constitutionally there is no such thing as an ‘exceptional’ or temporary law. Any time-
limited features of ‘emergency’ laws (e.g. ‘sunset clauses) are only constructed ad 
hoc at the insistence of parliament. These can and do cause some counterterrorist 
powers to lapse in time, yet this does not change legislative power structures, doing 
little or nothing to affect the executive’s ongoing dominance of the legislative process 
or any future political desire to create new laws that inevitably build on the last. This 
cycle of ‘emergency’ lawmaking begins anew the next time there is a major act of 
political violence. 
 
Mark Neocleous and Laura Donohue have both documented this legislative history. 
This begins with the 1914-15 Defence of the Realm Acts, which became the 1920 
Restoration of Order in Ireland Acts, which in turn became the 1922 Civil Authorities 
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 4 
(Special Powers) Act or SPA.
xxiii
xx Despite its supposedly temporary status the SPA was 
renewed annually for five years, then extended for another five years before being 
made permanent in 1933.xxi The 1973 Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act 
built on the SPA, and despite its name and being originally limited to two years,xxii it 
was added to with further Acts in 1978, 1987, 1991 and 1996.  At the same time 
parliament enacted the 1974 Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act in 
response to the Guildford and Birmingham pub bombings, about which Roy Jenkins, 
the home secretary who introduced the Act, famously said, ‘I would have been 
horrified to have been told at the time that it would still be law nearly two decades 
later’.xxiv In evidence to the House of Lords, former Northern Ireland human rights 
commissioner Brice Dickson commented on the symptomatic problems of this 
legislation:  
 
The [1974 Act], passed in the aftermath of the Guildford and Birmingham 
bombings, is a good example of Parliament acting in haste and repenting at 
leisure ... [it] was poorly drafted and hastily enacted. It did not, for example, 
take proper account of the requirements of the Convention on Human Rights... 
Later, of course, it transpired that the seven-day detention power under the Act 
was struck down by the European Court of Human Rights.xxv  
 
In the context of prospective peace in Northern Ireland in the mid-1990s, the then 
Conservative government commissioned an independent inquiry into the whole issue 
of terrorism legislation. The ‘Lloyd Report’,
xxvii
xxviii
xxvi as it became known, ultimately led to 
the carefully-considered Terrorism Act 2000, the aim of which was to ‘modernise and 
streamline legislation on terrorism’, provide ‘a settled legislative framework’,  and 
be ‘sufficiently flexible to respond to a changing threat’.  This Act consolidated, 
normalized and made permanent the previous patchwork of ‘provisional’ 
counterterrorism laws. It was understood politically as an effort to put a stop to the 
recurrent problems of counterterrorist lawmaking, and though lauded as procedurally, 
politically and legally sensible, it is a solid demonstration of the argument put forward 
by both Neocleous and Donohue that ‘exceptional’, temporary or reactive emergency 
laws almost always become permanent.xxix  
 
Despite this lengthy review process, the long tradition of legislating for security in a 
rushed, reactive and repetitious manner was quickly revived. With the Terrorism Act 
2000 having been on the statute books for a mere matter of months, the entire exercise 
was seemingly forgotten on 11 September 2001. The Anti-Terrorism, Crime and 
Security Act 2001 promptly followed, rushed through parliament as ‘emergency’ 
legislation, followed by four further counterterrorism or security laws.
xxxii
xxx Many of 
these repeated the mistakes of counterterrorism in Northern Ireland. Two examples 
are, first, reintroducing a form of detention without trial (or ‘internment’) for terrorist 
‘suspects’, a policy implicated in the ‘radicalization’ of the IRA and the alienation of 
communities;xxxi and second, police powers to stop and search individuals without 
needing reasonable grounds for suspicion, recognized as leading to discriminatory 
practices against ‘suspect’ communities, which in turn breeds counter-productive 
resentment.  Both of these powers were subsequently ruled to be contrary to human 
This is the Author’s Final Version of © Neal, A. (2012). Terrorism, Lawmaking and Democratic Politics: 
Legislators as Security Actors. Terrorism and Political Violence, 24(3), 357-374 doi: 
10.1080/09546553.2011.628721 
 
Please refer to the published article for citation purposes. 
 
 
 5 
rights laws, the first by the ‘Law Lords’ (the UK’s highest court at the time),xxxiii
xxxiv
 the 
second by the European Court of Human Rights.  
 
In November 2005, the government was forced by its own backbenchers to make 
major concessions on its Terrorism Bill over the issue of extended pre-charge 
detention for ‘terrorist suspects’ (known as the ‘90 day’ detention issue – note that in 
1974 seven days detention was controversial and ultimately rejected by the courts). 
And in October 2008, after seven years of a relentless legislative programme on 
security following 9/11 and the 7/7 London bombings in 2005, the government 
suffered a high-profile defeat in the House of Lords over the provisions of its 
Counter-Terrorism Bill on the same issue. 
 
After that, objections to whole legal counterterrorism edifice gathered momentum. 
Former home secretary Charles Clarke, responsible for introducing new 
counterterrorism laws when in office from 2004-2006, wrote in favour of a new legal 
consolidation,
xxxvi
xxxv while the parliamentary joint committee on human rights went 
much further in calling for an urgent ‘review of the necessity and proportionality of 
all counter-terrorism laws passed since 2001’.  Taken together, this represented a 
loss of enthusiasm in the legislature for further legislation.  
 
When the new Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition government took office in 
May 2010, it immediately announced an internal review of all counterterrorism laws 
and powers. The review proposed reducing or reforming some counterterrorist 
powers, such as replacing Control Orders with Terrorism Prevention and Investigation 
Measures and returning pre-charge police detention to 14 days.xxxvii
xxxviii
 However, in 2011 
the bills the government drafted to implement these changes proposed that any 
‘urgent situations’ where stronger powers were ‘considered necessary… would be 
catered for by the use of emergency legislation’.  So even efforts at reform 
anticipate a repetition of the same problematic counterterrorist lawmaking practices. 
 
Each time there is a terrorist event, security appears as a new and urgent problem to 
legislators. The response of legislating in a rushed, reactive and repetitive manner is 
well established and almost automatic. As Professor Anthony Bradley told the Lords 
Inquiry, ‘it is only when there has been a new terrorist event of some magnitude that 
the next instalment of anti-terrorist legislation is passed, and I have no answer to the 
question why these further instalments should be necessary’.xxxix And as Lord Lloyd, 
author of the 1996 ‘Inquiry into Terrorism Legislation’, told the BBC in 2005,  
 
the Terrorism Act of 2000…that came after about 30 years of Irish 
terrorism…was well thought out and it was comprehensive. And it was fair. 
That is the act we ought to be enforcing now instead of which, whenever a 
new terrorist event occurs, we start adding new things to that act. And that I 
think is a mistake. It started first immediately after the Omagh bombing and 
then it happened again after 9/11 in America and now it has happened again as 
a result of the terrorist activity of 7 July.xl  
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 6 
Although security problems appear new, the legislative response is not. Although the 
threats, suspect groups, governments and legislators themselves may change over the 
years, the same response is repeated. And although the content of new security laws 
may sometimes be innovative, the legislative process always suffers from the same 
problems of rushed, reactive and repetitious action.  
 
The unequal power relations of parliament 
 
Our starting point must be the structural observation that on the issue of terrorism, the 
legislature is heavily subordinated to the executive branch of government. By 
constitutional convention, it acts with cross-party consensus and defers to the security 
prerogative of the executive, which maintains a monopoly over the state intelligence 
and security apparatus. The unequal power relationship between the executive and 
legislature defines the nature and character of counterterrorist lawmaking. This 
relationship exists in ‘normal’ legislative politics but appears to be compounded in 
legislative security politics. Yet even in its relationship of subordination, the 
legislature plays a vital legitimating role that is central to lawmaking as a security 
practice. The legislature gives the law democratic legitimacy. At the same time 
however, counterterrorist lawmaking marginalizes the deliberative and critical 
functions of the legislature. Because of the convention of deference and consensus on 
tackling terrorism, this marginalization seems to happen through the passive assent of 
the legislature itself. 
  
An unusual feature of the British constitutional system is the presence of the 
executive within the legislature. Unlike some other constitutional systems, notably 
that of the US, there is not a strict separation of the legislative and executive branches 
of government in the UK. The overlap of the executive and legislature within 
parliament means that in addition to the relationships between political parties and the 
upper and lower houses, parliament is also divided between those who are members 
of the executive (the Government) and those who are not. This means that to analyse 
parliament is not simply to analyse the legislative branch of government, but rather to 
examine executive-legislative relations.  
 
Unequal power relations define the parliamentary field. The executive has command 
of the entire machinery of government with all the bureaucratic, informational and 
representations advantages that bestows, not to mention an electoral mandate. In 
contrast, membership of the legislature confers the possibility of invoking an 
alternative form of democratic capital against the dominant position of the 
government. Members of the Commons can speak from a position of democratic 
authority to scrutinize legislation, provide oversight of policies and hold the 
government to account. Members of the Lords lack democratic legitimacy but can 
often speak from a position of expertise from previous professional experience. The 
same is true of membership of a specialized parliamentary committee, which can 
speak with authority on a specific remit. 
 
The legislature has little coercive power to exercise against the executive. Because it 
is dominated by party, the freedom of action of individual members is highly 
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 7 
constrained. In the Commons, there are high costs for members who rebel against 
their party whips, especially for those who are also members of the government or 
potential members of a future government. There will be some who are happy to have 
a life in the political background in return for more independence, but for those 
motivated by a desire to influence policy, career advancement depends on patronage 
and promotion up the government and/or party ranks.
xliii
xli This is especially true in the 
British system, where parliament is the exclusive recruiting ground for members of 
present and future governments.xlii So members of legislatures are again weak. They 
have the option of exercising some coercive power by rebelling and voting against 
their party on legislative proposals and other motions. This happens increasingly 
often,  but it remains something of a blunt instrument with high political costs 
which is only to be used in extremis. Rebellions are more powerful when the 
government does not have an unassailable majority, as was the case in the third term 
of the last Labour government.xliv 
 
Despite these basic structural conditions, it is not enough to understand the 
parliamentary field in terms of a naked calculus of power. To do so would lead to a 
rather brief analysis and the conclusion that legislatures are simply irrelevant beyond 
the working majority of parliamentary votes they give the government. From here it 
would be simple to conclude that parliament is weak and poorly performs its function 
of holding the executive to account. Legislative members could be seen to act, in Max 
Weber’s mocking terms, as little more than ‘lobby fodder’.
xlvii
xlviii
xlv Flinders and Kelso 
argue that this view is ‘highly dubious’.xlvi Focusing on the outward structure of 
parliamentary power relations distracts from the importance of ‘unobserved control 
mechanisms’ such as backchannels between the executive and backbenchers, 
anticipated reactions and the role of internal party processes.  Moreover, they argue 
that the ‘parliamentary decline thesis’ – the orthodox view that parliament does not 
properly perform its constitutional role of holding the executive to account – is 
historically dubious and misunderstands the design of parliament as established in the 
constitutional reforms of the late 19th century.  Parliament, they argue, ‘was 
designed and intended to play a largely acquiescent role in all but the most extreme 
circumstances’, in order to facilitate a powerful executive that could get things done 
without being impeded by procedure, factionalism or vested interests.xlix  
 
The ‘unobserved control mechanisms’ of executive-legislative relations are 
methodologically quite difficult to discern, but the key point is that the most 
important functions and practices of parliament are not necessarily those which are 
overt. Although parliament was not designed to ‘check and balance’ executive power, 
that does not mean it is simply a ‘rubberstamp’ either. Even when appearing to act 
only passively and acquiescently, parliament performs a powerful legitimating 
function that is central to democratic government.l In a seminal study of the Brazilian 
parliament, Robert Packenham argued that the most important function of legislatures 
is a ‘latent legitimation’ derived from the mere fact of existing and meeting 
regularly.li While the UK parliament does more than that, the significance of his study 
is that legislatures do not have to perform independently, overtly or even actively in 
the policy process to be vitally important to the legitimacy of government itself. 
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More specifically for our analysis, lawmaking is a power the executive can mobilize 
only through the legitimizing recognition bestowed by the legislature. It is the 
executive that proposes new laws, but it is the legislature that enacts and gives assent 
to those laws.lii This legitimation may not necessarily take an active form. For most 
individual members of legislatures most of the time, legitimation and recognition are 
conferred passively. But the importance of recognition is made visible when assent is 
withheld from individual bills in backbench rebellions or when governments lose 
votes of no confidence. At other times its workings can be analyzed in the 
backchannels of influence in executive-legislative relations. 
 
These constitutional qualifications put the problems of counterterrorist lawmaking 
into starker relief. To legislate in an ‘emergency’ could certainly be construed as 
precisely the kind of ‘extreme circumstance’ in which parliament should play a more 
interventionist role. However, the historical record shows the opposite to be the case: 
post-terrorist attack lawmaking proceeds not just with strong government majorities, 
but with cross-party consensus. Although parliament does often insist on ad hoc 
safeguards such as sunset clauses and periodic reviews of counterterrorist powers, 
these are weak tools that do not alter the historical and ongoing institutionalisation of 
the practice of rushed, reactive and repetitious counterterrorist lawmaking. The 
legitimation and recognition bestowed by parliament is more forthcoming in this 
instance, not less. So while we should be realistic and well informed about the kind of 
role parliament can play in the legislative process, it is clear that there are 
complicating factors at work that are specific to security issues. In the next section we 
will examine these more closely.  
 
The compounding effect of security on the parliamentary field 
 
The issue of security compounds the unequal power relations of the parliamentary 
field. In many if not most countries, there is a constitutional convention that security 
is an area of executive prerogative. In the UK this is also manifested as a strong 
historical convention of cross-party consensus on counterterrorism, which means that 
terrorism is not a straightforward party political issue. This convention works against 
the overt politicization of security issues. Historically, this goes back to the sovereign 
right to declare war (which still exists in the UK as the ‘Royal Prerogative’, now 
vested in the Prime Minister).liii In the UK, the legislature and judiciary have cited 
this convention as the reason for their deference to the executive on matters of 
security.liv It is reinforced through capacity as much as propriety, since the judicial 
and legislative branches do not share access to executive intelligence and therefore 
lack the ability to authoritatively challenge assessments and assertions of threat. This 
has been construed by some parliamentarians as one of the central problems of 
counterterrorist lawmaking. 
 
For example, a critical report by the joint committee on human rights in 2010 
complained that parliamentarians suffer a lack of access ‘to information about the 
scale and nature of the threat posed by terrorism in order to be able to make 
judgments about the necessity and proportionality of the responses’.lv The problem is 
that the executive demand for the legislature to legislate on security issues is in 
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tension with the executive prerogative to declare and counter threats on the basis of 
secret intelligence, for the legislature is called upon to act without the means to 
deliberate properly. In the UK system, the legislature is effectively expected to take 
the word of the executive on trust. At times of perceived emergency it always does, 
but it also has little choice. The complaint is that without access to intelligence, 
legislators ‘do not have any way of testing the arguments’.lvi The expedited nature of 
post-terrorist attack legislation compounds the problem. Whereas normal legislative 
process allows opportunities for scrutiny, deliberation and parliamentary evidence 
taking, when ‘emergency’ legislation is fast-tracked, these opportunities all but 
disappear.lvii 
 
Andrew Defty argues that the existence and work of the intelligence and security 
committee (ISC) – created by the Intelligence Services Act in 1994 - is slowly but 
imperfectly remedying parliament’s lack of access to intelligence, with the turnover 
of ISC committee members meaning a small but growing number of senior 
parliamentarians have developed an expertise in this area, which in turn can improve 
the ability of parliament to exercise proper scrutiny and oversight.lviii Defty argues 
that current and former members of the ISC can ‘educate’ the rest of parliament in the 
understanding and expertise necessary to authoritatively challenge government 
arguments that rest on intelligence claims, even if this has not happened effectively to 
date.lix Before the late 1980s British governments officially denied the very existence 
of the security services, and opportunities for parliamentary scrutiny and oversight in 
the area of intelligence were non-existent.  
 
However, the constitution of the ISC demonstrates the tensions that exist on this issue. 
The ISC is not a parliamentary committee, but rather an unusual ‘committee of 
parliamentarians’ who meet in secret and report to the prime minister rather than 
parliament. Its members are bound to the Official Secrets Act 1989. Despite this 
compromise between government secrecy and parliamentary accountability, the 
annual reports of the ISC have shone much light on the workings of the previously 
opaque activities of intelligence agencies. This, however, is executive oversight, not 
legislative scrutiny. As Defty points out, the ISC generally focuses on the 
‘“administration, policy and expenditure” of the intelligence and security services and 
only occasionally on operational matters.lx It never comments on counterterrorist 
legislation, unlike, for example, the joint committee on human rights or the home 
affairs select committee. 
 
An analysis of parliamentary intelligence access and expertise is only part of the 
picture, however. While lack of intelligence knowledge and expertise are certainly 
problems for the legislature in counterterrorist lawmaking, we also need to consider 
the special forms of recognition and legitimation at work on security issues which 
derive from, and are reinforced by, the historical sovereign security prerogative. The 
virtual monopoly of the executive on intelligence and the means of threat declaration 
combines to form a strong concentration of symbolic capital in the hands of the 
executive at the expense of the legislature. Williams explains that ‘Capital comprises 
the resources that agents can drawn upon to act in a given field’,lxi and in this sense 
intelligence is a powerful resource. It is not simply that the executive has all the 
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information and the legislature has none. Rather, the executive monopoly over 
intelligence and security helps perpetuate, in a circular manner, the recognition of the 
executive as the legitimate authority on security.  
 
The importance of recognition in the reproduction of parliamentary power relations 
emphasizes the sociological point that symbolic power works not simply through 
coercion and persuasion, but through inculcation. Bourdieu argues that in social, 
political and institutional settings, success often depends on actors internalizing the 
‘rules of the game’: an implicit understanding of what is expected and reasonable and 
what would be deemed unacceptable or have other negative consequences. In 
legislative security politics, these rules seem to be expressed through certain habitual 
practices and expectations. The constitutional convention of deference to the 
executive is a central pillar of this, having an objective manifestation but also a 
subjective embodiment in the way parliamentarians expect and are expected to act on 
security matters. Bourdieu argues that conventions work as ‘principles which generate 
and organize practices’, creating ‘a world of already realized ends - procedures to 
follow, paths to take…’.
lxiii
lxii In the UK context, this is also frequently conveyed in the 
idea that after terrorist attacks, politicians must be seen to be doing something. For 
example, the 2009 Lords inquiry into fast-track legislation heard that ‘very often in 
the aftermath of a terrorist atrocity, politicians must be seen to be doing something, 
and there is a public mood that demands that’.  Politicians seem to know how they 
are expected to respond to terrorist attacks, which suggests that responses to terrorism 
are historically institutionalized and manifested as convention.  
 
The problems of counterterrorist lawmaking are structural, but also more than 
structural. In addition to the compounded power inequalities of the field, they seem to 
be embedded in the legitimating practices of parliamentarians themselves. Despite the 
fact that policy makers and legislators decry the problems of such legislation, they 
instinctively and habitually confer their democratic legitimacy on new laws presented 
by the executive the next time there is a major terrorist attack. Hence the power 
relationships of counterterrorist lawmaking do not simply consist of institutional, 
constitutional and political structures, but also apparent symbolic and mental 
structures, in the sense that making new laws has become part of the rules of the game 
and internalized as second nature to members of the legislature. 
 
For Bourdieu, once invested in the game it is easier to go along with it than against 
it.
lxvii
lxviii
lxiv This favours a reproduction of practices and durable dispositions rather than 
their reflexive alteration, with implications for the continuation of existing power 
structures.lxv As Bourdieu puts it, ‘power often resides in the – entropic – choice not 
to do, not to choose’, which chimes very much with the passive legitimating function 
of legislatures.lxvi But furthermore, Bourdieu argues that actors come to exhibit shared 
dispositions, collective common senses, habitual ways of thinking and acting or not 
thinking and not acting: collective ‘schemes of perception, thought and action’.  
This is an effect of what he terms the habitus: inculcated mental structures that 
accompany the objective social structures of fields. Habitus shapes practices and 
shapes actors’ understanding of their own practices. It gives actors a sense of why 
they do what they do, its importance, strategic direction and meaning.  
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Thus we might consider the legitimacy of new security legislation not to be 
constructed ad hoc around perceived new security threats as they arise, but in effect 
pre-constituted in the durable historical structures (constitutional, political and 
symbolic) of legislative security politics. Making new counterterrorist laws is a 
practice embedded in constitutional norms, shared mentalities and expected ways of 
responding to events. As Pouliot argues, ‘practices are the result of inarticulate know-
how that makes what is to be done self-evident or commonsensical’.lxix The practice 
of counterterrorist lawmaking is, in this sense, an effect of field and habitus. 
 
Misrecognition  
 
Given the degree to which legislators are instilled in the practice of counterterrorist 
lawmaking, it presents them with a dilemma about the stakes involved. The prevailing 
features of the practice are consensus and deference to the executive in the name of 
security. To provide security is arguably the raison d’être of the state,
lxxii
lxxiii
lxxiv
lxx and security 
is a highly symbolic issue, particularly when it involves terrorist attacks.lxxi Events 
such as 9/11 are not simply materially destructive, but are perceived and constructed 
as an attack on a nation, its values and its ‘way of life’.  As Lord Lloyd notes in his 
1996 report on terrorism legislation, terrorism is ‘seen as an attack on society as a 
whole’.  This is one reason for political consensus and the mantra that politicians 
must be seen to be doing something. From another angle, as securitization theory has 
long since stressed, the prerogative of defining the threat in order to claim the 
legitimate means to counter it is a characteristic feature of state power.  In 
Bourdieusian terms, this is symbolic power: the ‘power of making people see and 
believe, of predicting and prescribing, of making known and recognized’.lxxv A few 
parliamentarians might try to contest this (to little effect), but in general, 
parliamentarians have a profound stake in this symbolic power and would not want to 
appear out of touch with the public mood. 
 
But what the political sociology of Bourdieu adds to the equation is political struggle. 
There may be struggle over symbolic power, with competing representations of the 
threat and competing attempts to legitimize different means of dealing with it; in the 
parliamentary field of security politics this struggle is heavily stacked in favour of the 
executive, which in the wake of major acts of political violence is virtually assured 
recognition of its monopolistic symbolic position. Yet Bourdieu adds that struggle is 
always a double game: at once a symbolic struggle and a struggle for control of the 
objective apparatus of state: ‘a struggle for power over the “public power” (state 
administration)’.lxxvi The point is that political parties are, after all, struggling to win 
elections and secure control of government.  
 
[P]olitical parties must on the one hand develop and impose a representation 
of the social world capable of obtaining the support of the greatest possible 
number of citizens, and on the other hand win positions (whether of power or 
not) capable of ensuring that they can wield power over those who grant that 
power to them.lxxvii  
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Following Bourdieu, we should consider whether in legislative security politics the 
stakes are doubled: publically, to provide security or at least to demonstrate a 
symbolic monopoly over security representation, but also to win or hold objective 
political power. This presents members of the legislature with a dilemma. The 
universally avowed concern for public security and the conventions of consensus and 
deference in which it takes part may in fact conceal a partisan political struggle.lxxviii 
How do parliamentarians know that the executive really does know the nature of the 
threat, and is not merely asserting so for opportunistic political advantage? How do 
legislators know if security really is at stake, or whether the struggle is in fact party 
political? How do they know if legislative security politics is being practiced in good 
faith or bad? Again the problem is one of knowledge, but also of recognition and a 
heavily stacked terrain of contestation. 
 
While there is plenty of information on the security situation in the public domain that 
parliamentarians could deploy in the symbolic struggle, this is not comparable to the 
specific intelligence claims that governments use to justify their legislation, policies 
and actions. While legislators may have access to other sources of knowledge such as 
the work of security experts, and a few may have an inside view through their 
membership of the ISC, the enduring structures of recognition of the sovereign 
security prerogative mean that the executive will always be in a position to make the 
strongest claim to authority. Whether or not the executive has genuine knowledge of 
the threat, what matters is the recognition of its security authority, which is deeply 
institutionalized. This is the dilemma faced by legislators: the recognition and 
legitimation they bestow may be unfounded. It may be what Bourdieu terms 
misrecognition. lxxix There is always an opportunity for the executive to abuse the 
deference accorded to it for political reasons, but the legislature has little ability to 
authoritatively challenge it or know what is truly at stake.  
 
These unequal constitutional and symbolic power structures seem to be self-
perpetuating, reproduced not simply by the practices of the executive in good faith or 
bad, but by the embedded recognition and legitimation passively performed by 
parliamentarians. Arguably, misrecognition and the potentially concealed, doubled 
nature of the symbolic and political struggle are central but inscrutable features of 
counterterrorist lawmaking and security politics more generally. In this final part of 
this section we will look at three examples of this, where the executive jealously 
asserts its security prerogatives even when the evidential grounds for doing so prove 
to be flimsy and/or partisan.  
 
In a rare public lecture in 2009, Jonathan Evans, the Director General of the Security 
Service (MI5), said: 
 
After 9/11 the UK and other western countries were faced with the fact that 
the terrorist threat posed by Al Qaida was indiscriminate, global and massive. 
Now, 8 years on, we have a better understanding of the nature and scope of Al 
Qaida's capabilities but we did not have that understanding in the period 
immediately after 9/11 [emphasis added].lxxx 
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This demonstrates the problem that on some security issues, especially when they 
appear new, the executive may know the nature of the threat no better than anyone 
else, but nevertheless asserts and receives the authority to declare, define and respond 
to it. As we have heard, lack of access to intelligence has been a constant source of 
complaint from parliament’s joint committee on human rights; a complaint 
compounded by the fact that Evans gave this public lecture at all, despite constantly 
refusing ‘to give evidence to any parliamentary committee other than in private to the 
intelligence and security committee’.lxxxi  
 
Let us consider another example of the double game of security politics and the 
potential for misrecognition and political abuse. Governments are extremely sensitive 
about revealing their intelligence and its sources. This is often claimed to be for 
operational reasons, since informants, agents and officers in sensitive or dangerous 
positions could be compromised, at the same time revealing important details of 
intelligence gathering capacity, techniques and strategy, and undermining sensitive 
intelligence sharing relationships between governments, some of which may be rather 
unsavoury.  
 
This intelligence sharing argument was used by David Miliband when Foreign 
Secretary in early 2010.lxxxii
lxxxiii
lxxxiv
lxxxv
 He ordered the partial redaction of a judicial ruling on the 
case of UK resident Binyam Mohamed, who, when under detention at the behest of 
the US government, was tortured by the Pakistani intelligence service.  The 
information in the ruling was a CIA summary of Mohamed’s mistreatment by 
Pakistani intelligence that was sent to British intelligence in 2002, thus demonstrating 
British collusion. The Court of Appeal subsequently rejected the Foreign Secretary’s 
argument and forced the publication of the redacted paragraphs.  Miliband’s 
argument was one of national security, but lack of disclosure offers governments an 
opportunity to spin, manipulate, suppress or even fabricate intelligence, which is then 
extremely difficult for legislators (and indeed the judiciary and the public) to 
challenge authoritatively. Critics of Miliband suggested that the executive prerogative 
of secrecy was not being used to protect national security, but to prevent 
embarrassment to the government and avoid giving succour to political opponents 
rather than to ‘terrorists’.   
 
A final example: in the UK and US the executive has the ability not merely to declare 
threats or even a full-scale state of emergency (something of a blunt instrument which 
may strain credibility in the absence of an obvious and visible threatlxxxvi), but to set 
and modulate an official ‘threat level’. Both governments have created 
institutionalized systems for this,lxxxvii
lxxxviii
 which have come under both serious and 
satirical criticism for the apparent meaninglessness of, for example, raising the threat 
level from ‘substantial’ to ‘severe’ in the absence of any other public 
information.  The fear is that this kind of system presents the executive with an 
opportunity to manipulate the threat level for political advantage. Whether changes in 
the threat level are ‘true’ or not is almost impossible to verify without access to 
intelligence. Nevertheless executives almost always receive the benefit of the doubt 
from the other branches of government because they lack the symbolic capital to do 
otherwise. 
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In the UK, the government tried to quell doubts about political manipulation of the 
threat level by having an intelligence unit - the Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre or 
JTAC - set the threat level. In 2010 this became the subject of controversy in 
parliament because of the lack of an apparent link between the official ‘threat level’ 
and the government’s ongoing assertion that there is a ‘public emergency threatening 
the life of the nation’ This assertion has legal significance because it formed the 
admissible basis for the UK’s derogation from Article 5 of the European Convention 
on Human Rights in 2001, which facilitated the policy of detention without trial of 
foreign ‘terrorist suspects’ contained in the post-9/11 Anti-terrorism, Crime and 
Security Act 2001. Although this policy was eventually declared incompatible with 
the Human Rights Act by the courts,lxxxix the government did not drop the assertion, 
and neither has it been repudiated by the subsequent Conservative-Liberal Democrat 
government. In written evidence to the joint committee on human rights in early 2010, 
a security minister suggested that the (Labour) government would not necessarily 
drop the assertion ‘even if the threat level as assessed by JTAC was at “moderate” or 
“low”’.xc In its subsequent report, the JCHR expressed concern that, ‘the 
Government’s approach means that in effect there is a permanent state of emergency, 
and that this inevitably has a deleterious effect on public debate about the justification 
for counter-terrorism measures’.xci This demonstrates the double game of 
parliamentary security politics. Despite political gestures towards the depoliticization 
of intelligence, the government cannot but assert its secret intelligence prerogative. 
This has a direct effect of symbolic violence on public and indeed parliamentary 
debate on counterterrorism.  
 
Conclusions: the possibility of democracy? 
 
The conclusions to be drawn from this analysis of legislative security politics come 
close to those to be drawn from existing critical theories of security, but with some 
important departures. Its emphasis on the symbolic domination of the executive 
supports, to an extent, the dramatic claims about sovereign exceptionalism in the 
literature inspired by Carl Schmitt and Giorgio Agamben.
xciii
xcii The same could be said 
of the ‘elitist’ claims of securitization theory,  particularly its posited relationship 
between ‘speaker’ and ‘audience’, which could be mapped onto executive-legislative 
relations.xciv However, the conclusions to be drawn from this article differ in three 
important respects due to the specificities of the subject matter and the theoretical 
approach. The implications are political and methodological. 
 
First, deploying the sociological approach of Bourdieu enables an analysis of how 
these ‘sovereign’ capacities work. Executive security prerogative is not simply a de 
facto condition of sovereign/state power,xcv but rather is historically embedded in the 
institutional, social and mental structures of the wider parliamentary field. This field 
is defined by an unequal power relationship that involves domination and 
dispossession on the part of the executive but also legitimating recognition and 
passivity on the part of the legislature. This is not simply a discursive 
speaker/audience relationship but a power relationship. It exists in ‘normal’ legislative 
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politics but is compounded in legislative security politics. Legislative security politics 
is therefore not exceptional, as per the critical debates, but perhaps hyper-normal.  
 
Second, by analysing legislative security politics as a double game, we can see that 
security politics is not only about security but also about politics. This point is 
surprisingly absent in other literatures. Security may well be a problem to be solved or 
a discourse to be constructed and contested, but potentially it is also a concealed 
weapon in ongoing political struggles where the stake is not only security but also 
politics. The point is not simply that security politics can be practiced in good faith or 
bad, but rather that the legislative participants would have trouble to know the 
difference, given their compounded position of dispossession and their embedded 
(potential) misrecognition of the nature of the struggle.  
 
Third and finally, despite the problems inherent in the field and habitus of 
counterterrorist lawmaking, and despite the apparent pessimism contained in the 
above analysis, Bourdieu’s political sociology is built on the possibility of a more 
critical and less elitist democracy in a way that other forms of security analysis are 
not. Despite Bourdieu’s emphasis on durable dispositions, naturalized assumptions 
and embodied power structures, the possibility for democratic actors to recognize 
hitherto unquestioned problems and potentially move beyond them is central to 
Bourdieu’s wider project.xcvi As Topper explains:  
 
Bourdieu’s efforts to identify the precise ways in which contingent social 
norms, practices, and structures become “naturalized” is intended to open new 
spaces of political agency and resistance, to liberate social and political actors 
by enabling them to shape and act upon those forces that previously shaped 
and acted upon them, and to facilitate interventions in those chains of causality 
that restrict the development of more vital democratic institutions and 
practices.xcvii 
 
While we should not underestimate the enduring power structures of the 
parliamentary field and habitus, Bourdieu holds out the possibility, however weak, 
that actors could stop to examine their practice and mentality, question and recognize 
their problematic nature, denaturalize the structures that foster misrecognition, and 
potentially determine to do things differently. Parliament is a rather unfashionable 
place to vest one’s faint hopes for a more critical and democratic form of security 
politics. Perhaps then it is fitting to end with a parliamentary quote by a perversely 
apposite speaker: ‘If it is, on occasions, the place of low skulduggery, it is more often 
the place for the pursuit of noble causes.’xcviii Perhaps not more often, but maybe one 
day.        
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